



CAN PROMISSORY ESTOPPEL BE AN INDEPENDENT 
SOURCE OF RIGHTS? 
ALLISON SILINK٭ 
This article addresses persistent uncertainty in relation to the question, 
‘Can promissory estoppel be an independent source of rights under 
Australian law?’ A split has developed between intermediate courts of 
appeals in some jurisdictions on this question.  This article considers 
the operation of stare decisis in relation to a decision of an 
intermediate appellate court that departs from the ratio of the High 
Court, and the approach which is likely to be taken by the High Court 
to resolving the conflict between the states.   
I INTRODUCTION 
This article addresses persistent uncertainty in relation to the question, ‘Can 
promissory estoppel be an independent source of rights under Australian law?’1 
There is evident confusion as to the correct law.  In Queensland2 and Victoria,3 
and in the Federal Court,4 Waltons Stores (Interstate) Ltd v Maher5 (“Waltons 
Stores”) has been applied as authority for the principle that promissory estoppel 
can be an independent source of rights.  However, in New South Wales, the 
Court of Appeal has held that promissory estoppel is negative in substance and 
restricted to restraining the defendant from exercising legal rights. 6  
Accordingly, there is ‘a conflict of authority between intermediate courts of 
 
٭ Lecturer, University of Technology, Sydney 
1The concept of being an ‘independent source of rights’ in equity means that the estoppel itself is 
capable of giving rise to equitable rights and obligations: the claim is not limited to establishing 
the facts from which another cause of action might arise as estoppel by representation does; see 
for example, Jessica Hudson, “The True Purpose of Estoppel by Representation” (2015) Journal 
of Contract Law 275. Nor is it limited to restraining the defendant from exercising existing strict 
legal rights, which has been the traditional domain of promissory estoppel: see for example 
Equititrust Ltd (formerly Equitiloan Ltd) v Franks (2009) 259 ALR 388, 401 per Handley JA; 
DHJPM Pty Limited v Blackthorn Resources Limited (2011) 285 ALR 311, 323 per Meagher JA. 
2 Wright v Hamilton Enterprises [2003] QCA 36. 
3 ACN 074 971 109 Pty Ltd (as Trustee for the Argot Unit Trust) v The National Mutual Life 
Association of Australasia Ltd (2008) 21 VR 351. 
4 Yarrabee Chicken Company Pty Ltd v Steggles Limited [2010] FCA 394 per Jagot J.  Note this 
decision was not appealed on the estoppel finding but was successfully appealed in relation to 
findings in related proceedings in relation to the findings on the construction of contract: [2011] 
FCA 750. 
5 (1988) 164 CLR 387. 
6 Saleh v Romanous (2010) 79 NSWLR 453. 
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appeal in this country that requires resolution.’7 To add to the confusion, there 
have been recent statements by courts to the effect that ‘it is not yet finally 
resolved in Australia whether promissory estoppel can operate as a cause of 
action,’8 and that it is ‘an open question, whether the doctrine of promissory 
estoppel constitutes a foundation of legal rights independently of any other 
cause of action,’9 suggesting that the common law of Australia is not clearly 
decided on this issue. 
The contribution of this article to these present uncertainties is to makes 
three central arguments which start from the proposition that there is ‘one 
common law’10 of Australia, including equitable principles, not a separate 
common law of each state.  This perspective assists in clarifying how the 
jurisdictional differences in relation to the ability of promissory estoppel to be 
an independent source of rights ought to be resolved. 
Firstly, it is argued that there ought to be no uncertainty about the ability 
of promissory estoppel to be an independent source of rights under Australian 
law because this was the ratio of the High Court’s decision in Waltons Stores, 
not simply dicta as has also been recently suggested.11  This ratio has not been 
varied or overturned by the High Court. Accordingly, on one level, the unity of 
the common law on this question ought to be clear.  
To say that the law is clear with respect to the ability of promissory 
estoppel to be a source of rights is not to deny the ongoing debate as to the 
circumstances in which such an equitable estoppel might arise. 12   These issues 
 
7 As there was in New South Wales v Lepore (2003) 212 CLR 511 [6] per Gleeson CJ, warranting 
clarification by the High Court. 
8 Mineralogy Pty Ltd v Sino Iron Pty Ltd (No 6) [2015] FCA 825 per Edelman J. 
9 Harrison v Harrison [2011] VSC 459, [370] per Kaye J.  See also Worthington v Worthington 
[No 2] [2014] WASC 448 at [26] per Kenneth Martin J where his Honours describes it as an 
‘unresolved an controversial debate’, and .Australian Communications Corporation & Anor v 
Coles Group Ltd [2011] VSC 490, per Cavanough J at [321], ‘[321] There is some uncertainty as 
to whether promissory estoppel constitutes an independent cause of action, or whether it is a 
doctrine by which one party is estopped from denying an element of a cause of action relied on 
by a another.’; and  
  Equuscorp Pty Ltd and Anor v Glengallan Investments Pty Ltd and Ors [2006] QCA 194, 
McPherson JA said at [31], “The doctrine of promissory estoppel may, I realise, no longer now 
be confined to the suspension of existing contractual relations but is capable of affecting entry 
into new legal relations: see Waltons Stores (Interstate) Ltd v Maher (1988) 164 CLR 387, at 
406–407, 428–429.” (emphasis added). 
10 See for example Kable v DPP (NSW) (1996) 189 CLR 51 at 112 -113 per McHugh J. 
11 Ashton v Pratt [2015] NSWCA 12; (2015) 318 ALR 260, 287 [138] per Bathurst CJ. 
12The features of the different models of promissory estoppel which can be found in Australian 
case law have been examined in detail by Andrew Robertson. Andrew Robertson, ‘Three models 
of promissory estoppel’ (2013) Journal of Equity 226.  In particular, there is an important but 
unresolved question as to whether it is necessary for the plaintiff to have assumed that a legal 
relationship already existed with the defendant, or would come into existence between them, 
from which the defendant would not be free to withdraw. This was a requirement identified by 
Brennan J as the first element of the six elements necessary to establish to raise an equitable 
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have been discussed elsewhere.13  However, in relation to the more basic, 
primary question as to whether promissory estoppel can be an independent 
source of rights in relation to non land-based promises, it is respectfully 
suggested that this is not an ‘unresolved’14 issue under Australian law.  
The second issue explored is the nature and effect of the jurisdictional split 
between New South Wales and other jurisdictions.  The New South Wales 
Court of Appeal in Saleh v Romanous restated the principle of promissory 
estoppel as negative in substance (in other words, not an independent source of 
rights).  Since that decision, lower courts in New South Wales have regarded 
themselves bound to apply this contrary principle, notwithstanding the 
apparent conflict with Waltons Stores.  It is argued that under the principles of 
stare decisis, lower courts in New South Wales are bound to apply the decisions 
of the Court of Appeal, despite the fact that it is apparently contradictory to the 
ratio of the High Court in Waltons Stores.15 The effect of this is to entrench the 
apparent fracture in the common law.  The same set of facts can now be 
potentially decided according to quite different principles depending on the 
jurisdiction in which the proceedings are brought.    It is argued that in theory, 
this jurisdictional split does not undermine the ‘one common law principle’. 
The High Court has said that where differences in the common law emerge 
between intermediate appellate courts, it does not mean that the unity of the 
common law does not exist, rather it means that one or more intermediate 
courts of appeal will have not applied the law correctly.16 However, in practice, 
there is no unity of common law principle being applied across Australia. 
Accordingly, unless the New South Wales Court of Appeal reverses its earlier 
decision in Saleh v Romanous, this jurisdictional split can only be corrected by 
the High Court.   
The final issue considered in this article is the relevant approach to 
 
 
estoppel see Waltons Stores (Interstate) Ltd v Maher  (1988) 167 CLR 384, 428-429 per Brennan 
J.  However, it was not required to be established by Mason CJ and Wilson J in their joint 
judgment at 406.   
13 For further discussion see, for example, EK Nominees Pty Ltd v Woolworths Limited [2006] 
NSWSC 1172; Construction Technologies Australia Pty Ltd v Doueihi [2014] NSWSC 1717, 
contra DHJPM Pty Ltd v Blackthorn Resources Limited [2011] NSWCA 348 and TMA Australia 
Pty Ltd v Indect Electronics & Distribution GmbH [2015] NSWCA 343; see also A Silink, 
“Estoppel in Subject to Contract Negotiations” (2011) 5 Journal of Equity 252. 
14 Mineralogy Pty Ltd v Sino Iron Pty Ltd (no 6) [2015] FCA 825, [769] per Edelman J. 
15 This arises because of the application of the principle in Miliangos v Goerge Frank Textiles 
[1976] AC 443, 478. 
16 Lipohar v R (1999) 200 CLR 485 [45] per Gaudron, Gummow and Hayne JJ, ‘Different 
intermediate appellate courts within that hierarchy may give inconsistent rulings upon questions 
of common law. This disagreement will indicate that not all of these courts will have correctly 
applied or declared the common law. But it does not follow that there are as many bodies of 
common law as there are intermediate courts of appeal.’ 
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resolving this jurisdiction split if a case in which it is raised is granted leave to 
appeal the High Court.17  It is important to remember that the issue will not be 
whether the current High Court necessarily agrees with the development in the 
law of promissory estoppel which took place in the era of the Mason High 
Court.  It is not an open question for the High Court to determine afresh as it is 
under English law.18 The relevant question now is whether there are grounds 
upon which the current High Court would reverse its earlier decision in 
Waltons Stores.  In light of the well-known considerations applied by the High 
Court in deciding whether to reverse an earlier decision, it is argued that it is 
unlikely that the High Court would overturn Waltons Stores on this point.  
However, in the current climate of uncertainty, it is to be hoped that a suitable 
vehicle to clarify both the ability and scope of promissory estoppel to be a 
source of rights under Australian law, arrives soon. 
II THE RATIO OF WALTON STORES 
In light of the above it is therefore clearly necessary to return to this most basic 
question: what is the ratio of Waltons Stores?19  
A Reasons for judgment in Waltons Stores 
The majority in the High Court (Mason CJ and Wilson J in a joint judgment, 
and Brennan J in a separate judgment) found that Waltons was estopped from 
denying that it had impliedly promised to complete the contract for lease of the 
Mahers’ property. Orders made by the trial judge that Waltons was required to 
pay equitable damages in lieu of specific performance of the lease were upheld 
and the appeal was unanimously dismissed. The other members of the court 
(Deane J and Gaudron J) agreed in dismissing the appeal, but found on the 
basis of a common law estoppel and accordingly, their reasons are not the focus 
of this part identifying the ratio of the decision.20     
 
17 The resolution of such jurisdictional differences would be a significant factor in favour of 
being granted leave to appeal: New South Wales v Lepore (2003) 212 CLR 511 [6] per Gleeson CJ. 
18 For a discussion of the considerations in relation to the possible future development of English 
law in relation to equitable estoppel arising from non-land based promises, see Ben McFarlane, 
‘The limits to estoppels’ (2013) 7 Journal of Equity 250.   
19 (1988) 164 CLR 387. 
20 Ibid 444 per Deane J.  Deane J found that the facts sufficed to found a common law estoppel 
precluding Waltons from denying the existence of a binding agreement for lease.   His Honour 
developed his support for a unified estoppel by conduct which applied to representations of fact 
and future intention (at 450-452).  This view has not been adopted and is not developed further 
here for present purposes.  Gaudron J (at 460) also found for the Mahers on the basis of a 
common law estoppel as her Honour accepted that the Mahers had made an assumption that 
exchange had occurred.  However, her Honour discussed the nature of equitable estoppel and in 
obiter, indicated her support for the view that equitable estoppel could be extended to deal with 
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1 Mason CJ and Wilson J 
Mason CJ and Wilson J21 found that the evidence did not support the claim that 
the Mahers believed that contracts had already been exchanged or that a 
binding contract had already come into existence.22  Rather, the evidence 
supported the finding that Mr Maher believed that contracts would be 
exchanged – an assumption as to the future.23  Their Honours said, “This brings 
us to the doctrine of promissory estoppel on which the respondent relied in this 
Court.” 24   Their Honours noted that promissory estoppel extended to 
representations of future conduct, but that so far the doctrine had been mainly 
confined to ‘precluding departure from a representation in a pre-existing 
contractual relationship that [the defendant] will not enforce his contractual 
rights.’25  Their Honours said that ‘[i]n principle there is certainly no reason 
why the doctrine should not apply so as to preclude departure by a person from 
a representation that he will not enforce a non-contractual right.’26  Their 
Honours observed that there had been an historical reluctance to allow 
promissory estoppel to become the vehicle for the positive enforcement of a 
representation by a party that he would do something in the future.27  But they 
noted that this was the relevant issue in the proceedings. 28    
These introductory observations make it clear that their Honours were 
addressing the expansion of promissory estoppel.  They noted the historical 
objection to such a development on the basis of the threat it posed to the 
doctrine of consideration.29  However, they also considered the argument in 
favour of it: 
True it is that in the orthodox case of promissory estoppel, where the 
promisor promises that he will not exercise or enforce an existing right, 
the elements of reliance and detriment attract equitable intervention 
on the basis that it is unconscionable for the promisor to depart from 
his promise, if to do so will result in detriment to the promisee. And it 
can be argued (see, e.g., Greig and Davis, Law of Contract, p. 184) that 
there is no justification for applying the doctrine of promissory 
estoppel in this situation, yet denying it in the case of a non-
contractual promise in the absence of a pre-existing relationship. The 
 
 
assumptions as to future contractual rights that were not within the scope of proprietary 
estoppel. 
21 Ibid from 392. 
22 Ibid 397. 
23 Ibid. 
24 Ibid 399. 
25 Ibid. 
26 Ibid 399. 
27 Ibid 400. 
28 Ibid. 
29 Ibid. 
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promise, if enforced, works a change in the relationship of the parties, 
by altering an existing legal relationship in the first situation and by 
creating a new legal relationship in the second.30 
After a review of a number of both promissory and proprietary estoppel cases, 
finding in them a ‘common thread which links them together’, their Honours 
concluded: 
The foregoing review of the doctrine of promissory estoppel indicates 
that the doctrine extends to the enforcement of voluntary promises on 
the footing that a departure from the basic assumptions underlying the 
transaction between the parties must be unconscionable. As failure to 
fulfil a promise does not of itself amount to unconscionable conduct, 
mere reliance on an executory promise to do something, resulting in 
the promisee changing his position or suffering detriment, does not 
bring promissory estoppel into play. Something more would be 
required...31 
Their Honours then referred to the ‘application of these principles to the facts of 
the present case.’32  Their Honours found that in the circumstances of the 
urgency of the transaction and the silence of Waltons whilst in receipt of the 
signed counterpart of the contract for lease, it was unconscionable for Waltons, 
knowing that the Mahers were exposing themselves to detriment, ‘to adopt a 
course of inaction which encouraged them in the course they adopted.’33 Their 
Honours finally concluded that, ‘To express the point in the language of 
promissory estoppel, the appellant is estopped in all the circumstances from 
retreating from its implied promise to complete the contract.’34  The joint 
judgment was thus clearly an endorsement of an expanded promissory estoppel 
capable of being used as a source of rights.   
2 The reasons for judgment of Brennan J 
Brennan J35 also found that Mr Maher had assumed that a binding agreement 
would be brought into existence and that Mr Maher expected that execution 
and delivery of the original deed would take place as a matter of course36 and 
noted that this basis for a claim of estoppel was ‘radically different’ to the other 
two alternative bases that had been argued, namely, that Waltons had 
completed the exchange, or that there was a binding contract in existence.  The 
future promise could be supported, if at all, only by equitable estoppel, whereas 
 
30 Ibid 401. 
31 Ibid 405. 
32 Ibid 406. 
33 Ibid 407-408. 
34 Ibid 408. 
35 Ibid. 
36 Ibid 410. 
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the other two fell within the scope of estoppel in pais.37   
In relation to the assumption that Waltons would complete the exchange, 
Brennan J posed the rhetorical question whether the Mahers’ circumstances 
were such as to raise an equity of the kind described by Danckwerts LJ in 
Inwards v Baker, ‘an equity created by estoppel, or equitable estoppel, … by 
which the person who has made the expenditure is induced by the expectation 
of obtaining protection, and equity protects him so that an injustice may not be 
perpetrated.’38     
Brennan J observed that whilst he did not find it generally helpful to divide 
into classes the cases in which an equity created by estoppel had been held to 
exist, they served to ‘identify the characteristics of the circumstances which 
have been held to give rise to an equity in the party raising the estoppel.’39  He 
noted the traditional scope of promissory estoppel, in which ‘the equity binds 
the holder of a legal right who induces another to expect that right will not be 
exercised against him,’ and proprietary estoppel, where ‘the equity binds the 
owner of property who induces another to expect that an interest in the 
property will be conferred on him.’40  It is important to appreciate that Brennan 
J at no point rejected the existence of these recognised classes or suggested that 
‘equitable estoppel’ was to be regarded as a different principle.  Rather, his 
discussion of the principles of equitable estoppel confirms that certain common 
principles underpin these recognised classes of equitable estoppel. 
Brennan J then discussed these common features of the equity created by 
an equitable estoppel and against this background, then considered the 
traditional limitations upon the scope of the remedy offered by promissory 
estoppel.41  His Honour noted that it had been limited to preventing the 
enforcement of existing legal rights.42  However his Honour then reasoned: 
 
37 Ibid 413. Estoppel in pais refers to estoppel by representation at common law. Brennan J 
dismissed the second and third bases in short reasons. The second basis was dismissed on the 
grounds that the evidence demonstrated that the Mahers’ solicitor, Mr Elvy, their agent for the 
purposes of effecting a binding agreement, knew there had been no exchange.  In relation to the 
third basis, that a binding contract was in existence, Brennan J reasoned that the belief that there 
was an existing agreement was capable of two meanings: one that there was a contract in 
existence or the other being that there was binding obligation on Waltons to do what was 
necessary to complete the “formality”.  His Honour thought it was extremely doubtful that there 
was any evidence to support the first meaning, and that the second meaning gave rise to an 
equity covered under the reasons dealing with the assumption that exchange would take place. 
(at 430-431). 
38 [1965] 2 QB 29, 38. Although Inwards v Baker was a proprietary estoppel case, it is clear that 
Brennan J was not proposing that the circumstances of the case fell within the scope of 
proprietary estoppel as such.  His Honour was rather addressing the nature of the ‘equity’ 
created by an equitable estoppel, which he then developed in detailed reasons. 
39 Waltons Stores (Interstate) Ltd v Maher (1988) 164 CLR 387, 418. 
40 Ibid 420. 
41 Ibid 
42 Ibid. 
                        The University of Western Australia Law Review          Volume 40 
 
46 
…But there is a logical difficulty in limiting the principle [of 
promissory estoppel] so that it applies only to promises to suspend or 
extinguish existing rights. If a promise by A not to enforce an existing 
right against B is to confer an equitable right on B to compel fulfilment 
of the promise, why should B be denied the same protection in similar 
circumstances if the promise is intended to create in B a new legal right 
against A? There is no logical distinction to be drawn between a 
change in legal relationships effected by a promise which extinguishes 
a right and a change in legal relationships effected by a promise which 
creates one. Why should an equity of the kind to which Combe v 
Combe refers be regarded as a shield but not a sword? The want of 
logic in the limitation on the remedy is well exposed in Mr David 
Jackson's essay “Estoppel as a Sword” in (1965) 81 Law Quarterly 
Review 84, 223 at 241–3.  
Moreover, unless the cases of proprietary estoppel are attributed to a 
different equity from that which explains the cases of promissory 
estoppel, the enforcement of promises to create new proprietary rights 
cannot be reconciled with a limitation on the enforcement of other 
promises. If it be unconscionable for an owner of property in certain 
circumstances to fail to fulfil a non-contractual promise that he will 
convey an interest in the property to another, is there any reason in 
principle why it is not unconscionable in similar circumstances for a 
person to fail to fulfil a non-contractual promise that he will confer a 
non-proprietary legal right on another? It does not accord with 
principle to hold that equity, in seeking to avoid detriment occasioned 
by unconscionable conduct, can give relief in some cases but not in 
others. 43 
This passage clearly demonstrates that Brennan J rejected the dichotomy under 
which only estoppel arising from land-based promises could be a source of 
rights and that other types of promises, the subject of promissory estoppel, 
could not.   
His Honour emphasised that the object of equitable estoppel was the 
prevention of detriment rather than the enforcement of promises and that as 
the satisfaction of the equity calls for the enforcement of a promise only to the 
extent necessary to remove detriment, “equitable estoppel does not elevate non-
contractual promises to the level of contractual promises and the doctrine of 
consideration is not blown away by a side-wind.”44  His Honour imposed no 
limitation on whether such non-contractual promises had to relate to land or 
not.  His Honour postulated the now familiar six elements necessary to 
establish an equitable estoppel, whether promissory or proprietary,45 and found 
 
43 Ibid 425-426. 
44 Ibid 427. 
45 Ibid 428-429 per Brennan J, “In my opinion, to establish an equitable estoppel, it is necessary 
for a plaintiff to prove that (1) the plaintiff assumed that a particular legal relationship then 
existed between the plaintiff and the defendant or expected that a particular legal relationship 
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that the Mahers’ assumption was ‘such a case’.46   
The detriment arising from Waltons’ failure to fulfil its promise to 
complete could only be remedied by means of an expanded promissory 
estoppel:  it was not a promise relating to the grant of an interest in land within 
the scope of proprietary estoppel as defined earlier in his Honour’s reasons, and 
was not a representation of existing fact which would fall within the scope of 
estoppel by representation. Brennan J held that as the Mahers would suffer loss 
if Waltons failed to execute and deliver the original deed as promised, there was 
an equity in the Mahers which was to be satisfied by treating Waltons as if it 
had executed and delivered the original deed.47  The first basis for relief 
identified by Brennan J in relation to the Mahers’ assumption of Waltons Stores’ 
future intention therefore succeeded. Equitable estoppel was therefore applied 
in a manner which necessitated expanding the traditional limitations of 
promissory estoppel to afford relief in the Mahers’ case. 
Finally, in the context of discussing the fact that the Statute of Frauds 
would have no operation in relation to the equitable relief to be ordered, 
Brennan J again made it clear that he was dealing with relief arising from an 
equity that arose from a promissory, not proprietary, estoppel.  His Honour 
held: 
The Statute of Frauds and similar provisions prescribing formalities 
affecting proof of contracts have never stood in the way of a decree to 
enforce a proprietary estoppel (see Crook v. Corporation of Seaford) 
and, in principle, there is no reason why such provisions should apply 
when any other equity is created by estoppel.48 
This reasoning only makes sense as an endorsement of the positive scope of 
promissory estoppel to create new rights in the same way that a proprietary 
estoppel is capable of creating new rights which are not defeated by Statute of 
Frauds provisions.  Otherwise, the comparison drawn with proprietary estoppel 





would exist between them and, in the latter case, that the defendant would not be free to 
withdraw from the expected legal relationship; (2) the defendant has induced the plaintiff to 
adopt that assumption or expectation; (3) the plaintiff acts or abstains from acting in reliance on 
the assumption or expectation; (4) the defendant knew or intended him to do so; (5) the 
plaintiff's action or inaction will occasion detriment if the assumption or expectation is not 
fulfilled; and (6) the defendant has failed to act to avoid that detriment whether by fulfilling the 
assumption or expectation or otherwise.” 
46 Ibid 429-430. 
47 Ibid 430. 
48 Ibid 433.  
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B Conclusion as to the ratio of Waltons Stores 
Did this expansion of promissory estoppel approved by Mason CJ and Wilson J, 
and Brennan J, form part of the ratio of the case?  The ratio in a case identifies 
the reasons for decision in that particular case49 - or as has been said, the 
principle or principles upon which the case was decided: Osborne v Rowlett.50  
The definition of a ratio decidendi given by Cross and Harris in Precedent in 
English Law is often cited: ‘any rule expressly or impliedly treated by the judge 
as a necessary step in reaching his conclusion, having regard to the line of 
reasoning adopted by him, or a necessary part of his direction to the jury.’51 In 
Garcia v National Australia Bank Ltd, Kirby J stated that: 
It is fundamental to the ascertainment of the binding rule of a judicial 
decision that it should be derived from (1) the reasons of the judges agreeing in 
the order disposing of the proceedings; (2) upon a matter in issue in the 
proceedings; (3) upon which a decision is necessary to arrive at that order.52 
There can be no doubt that the expansion of the scope of promissory 
estoppel was squarely in issue in the case: without it the Mahers could not 
succeed in relation to their assumption as to the future intentions of the 
defendant.  This analysis of the reasons of the majority demonstrates that the 
court lifted the restrictions on promissory estoppel to enable it to be a source of 
rights, and applied this equitable estoppel to grant positive relief to the Mahers.   
The relief granted was in the form of equitable damages in lieu of specific 
performance of the contract that Waltons Stores had induced the Mahers to 
assume it would enter. It is important to recognise that relief did not flow from 
another cause of action (such as breach of contract) arising from a state of 
affairs established by the estoppel, as would be the case if estoppel by 
representation had applied. Whilst Deane J and Gaudron J would have found 
on this basis, it was not an available basis for relief for the majority because the 
nature of the operative assumption was held to relate to future intention, not a 
matter of fact.  Nor was equitable relief granted in respect of a proprietary 
estoppel arising from a promise as to the grant of an interest in land.  Whilst it 
has been suggested than it might have been possible to argue the case as an 
unusual claim in proprietary estoppel53 it was neither argued on this ground, 
 
49 Idya Pty Ltd v Anastasiou [2008] NSWCA 102 [28] per Beazley JA, Mason P agreeing. 
50 (1880) 13 Ch D 774, 785. 
51 R Cross and JW Harris, Precedent in English Law (Clarendon Press 4th ed, 1991) 72, cited in 
Klewer v Attorney General in and for the State of New South Wales [2010] NSWCA 219 [20]. 
52 (1998) 194 CLR 395, [56].  His Honour reiterated this approach in D’Orta-Ekenaike v Victoria 
Legal Aid (2005) 223 CLR 1 at [224].  This was cited with approval in Idya Pty Ltd v Anastasiou 
[2008] NSWCA 102 at [28] per Beazley JA, Mason P agreeing.  See also Coleman v Power (2004) 
220 CLR 1, [79] per McHugh J, cited with approval by Kirby J in D’Orta-Ekenaike v Victoria 
Legal Aid (2005) 223 CLR 1 at [226]. 
53 KR Handley, Estoppel by Conduct and Election, (Sweet & Maxwell, London 2006) [11-030]-
[11-034]; [11-040]-[11-041]. 
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nor were reasons given addressing this argument.   
  Accordingly, it is argued that the reasons of the majority in Waltons 
Stores in relation to an expanded promissory estoppel were not just ‘significant 
dicta’,54 but comprised the ratio of the case: it was the principle of law expressly 
treated by the majority in Waltons Stores as a necessary step in reaching their 
conclusion that Waltons was estopped from denying the implied promise to 
complete the contract for lease and gave rise to positive equitable relief.  
However, even if this analysis is wrong, there is no doubt that these reasons 
constitute ‘seriously considered dicta uttered by a majority’ in the High Court 
on this issue.55  It therefore ought to be followed unless it has been overturned 
by the High Court subsequently.56    
There is (at least) one question of taxonomy in relation to equitable 
estoppel under Australian law which has arisen from the decision in Waltons 
Stores. That is whether the majority should be seen as having unified the 
doctrines of promissory and proprietary estoppel into a single doctrine of 
‘equitable estoppel’ or not.  
It has just been demonstrated that promissory estoppel was shorn of its 
restrictive limitations by the majority and applied as a source of rights in a 
manner which would not have fallen within the scope of proprietary estoppel or 
the traditional scope of promissory estoppel.   As a consequence, at a certain 
level of generality, the essential elements of equitable estoppel were identified 
by the majority as being the same for both proprietary and promissory 
estoppels, though in slightly different formulations.   
However, it is argued that it does not follow from this that Waltons Stores 
requires the rejection of the different classes of ‘equitable estoppel’.57  It is true, 
as already noted, that Brennan J said that he did not find it generally helpful to 
divide into classes the cases in which an equity created by estoppel had been 
held to exist.  However, his Honour also noted that they served to ‘identify the 
characteristics of the circumstances which have been held to give rise to an 
equity in the party raising the estoppel.’58 Neither Mason CJ and Wilson J, nor 
Brennan J, clearly held that it was a necessary part of the development of the 
law that the recognised classes of case, promissory and proprietary, should be 
abandoned, even if they shared common elements to be established.  However, 
what is clear, for present purposes, is that equitable estoppel under Australian 
law is no longer defined by a dichotomy between land-based assumptions 
which can be a source of rights and other assumptions which cannot.    
 
54 Ashton v Pratt [2015] NSWCA 12; (2015) 318 ALR 260, 287 [138] per Bathurst CJ. 
55 Farah Constructions v Say-Dee (2007) 230 CLR 89 [134], [158]. 
56 See for example Garcia v National Australia Bank (1998) 194 CLR 395, [17] per Gaudron, 
McHugh, Gummow and Hayne JJ; [56]-[58] per Kirby J; [107] per Callinan J; Gett v Tabet 
(20090 254 ALR 504, [272]. 
57 Waltons Stores (Interstate) Ltd v Maher  (1988) 164 CLR 387, 420.  
58 Ibid. 
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C   Ratio has not been overturned by the High Court subsequently  
 
The cases on equitable estoppel decided by the High Court since Waltons Stores 
have not overturned the ratio of that case.  Commonwealth v Verwayen59 was 
decided two years after Waltons Stores.  As is well known, Verwayen lacks a 
clear ratio.60  However, the context of the claim was clearly a voluntary, non-
contractual promise rather than a claim falling within the traditional scope of 
proprietary estoppel.  There was no division in the court as to the scope of 
equitable estoppel under the law to be a source of rights in this promissory, as 
opposed to proprietary, context.  The positive scope of equitable estoppel 
accepted in Waltons Stores was expressly or impliedly approved by Mason CJ61 
(with whom Gaudron J agreed62), by Brennan J,63 Dawson J64 (with whom 
Deane J agreed,65), Toohey J66 and McHugh J.67  McHugh J noted expressly that 
both promissory and proprietary estoppels were sources of rights in equity: 
One important difference between the common law doctrine of estoppel in 
pais and the equitable doctrines of promissory and proprietary estoppel is that 
the common law doctrine is concerned with the rules of evidence, 
notwithstanding that a common law claim of estoppel must be pleaded, while 
the equitable doctrines are concerned with the creation of new rights between 
the parties. ….  the equitable doctrines of estoppel create rights. They give rise 
to equities which are enforceable against the party estopped. The equitable 
doctrines result in new rights between the parties when it is unconscionable for 
a party to insist on his or her strict legal rights.’68   
Indeed, three years later in Australian Securities Commission v 
Marlborough Gold Mines Ltd 69  the High Court referred to “an equitable 
estoppel of the kind upheld in Verwayen”.70 The claim was a claim to hold the 
 
59 (1990) 170 CLR 394. 
60 Of the four judges in the majority, two judges (Deane and Dawson JJ) found that the 
Commonwealth was estopped from denying that it had promised not to rely upon the limitation 
defence, whilst two judges (Toohey and Gaudron JJ) found that the Commonwealth had waived 
its rights to rely upon the limitation defence. 
61 (1990)  170 CLR 394, 410, 412. 
62 Ibid 487. 
63 Ibid 422. 
64 Ibid 454. 
65 Ibid 431, though also expressing his own view of a new model of estoppel by conduct. 
66 Ibid 475-476. 
67 Ibid 500-501. 
68 Ibid 500. 
69 (1993) 112 ALR 627. 
70 Ibid 639.  The respondent was granted an order from the Supreme Court of Western Australia 
under s 411(1) of the Corporations Law that a meeting be convened to consider a scheme of 
arrangement under that section which would change the company's status from that of a 
company limited by shares to that of a no liability company. The appellant had indicated that it 
would not make submissions in opposition to the scheme.  However, after the meeting had been 
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Australian Securities Commission to a non-contractual assurance that it would 
not object to a scheme of arrangement which would change the respondent's 
status from that of a company limited by shares to that of a no liability 
company.  The High Court did not raise any doctrinal objection to the nature 
of the claim.71 
In Giumelli v Giumelli 72  the joint judgment cited with approval the 
reference in Marlborough’s case to “an equitable estoppel of the kind upheld in 
Verywayen”73 even though both Marlborough and Verwayen were promissory 
estoppel cases.  Although this was a proprietary estoppel case, nothing said in 
the judgments contradicted the scope of equitable promissory estoppel to be a 
source of positive rights.  The most recent consideration of equitable estoppel 
by the High Court was in Sidhu v Van Dyke.74  Although it was another 
proprietary estoppel case, nothing said by the plurality or by Gageler J 
otherwise overturned or questioned the ratio of Waltons Stores with respect to 
the scope of promissory estoppel.75   
This review of High Court consideration of Waltons Stores demonstrates 
that the High Court has not expressly or impliedly overturned that 
development since it was decided.   
III JURISDICTIONAL SPLIT – NEW SOUTH WALES  
A number of intermediate courts of appeal have applied or discussed Waltons 
Stores as authority for an expanded promissory estoppel capable of giving rise 
to positive rights: see for example Australian Crime Commission v Gray;76 
 
 
held, it became aware of the decision of the Full Federal Court in Windsor v National Mutual 
Life Association of Australasia Ltd in which it was held that was beyond the scope s. 411.  The 
appellant then changed its position and opposed the scheme when approval was sought from the 
court.   
71 Ibid, 640.  The Court found that on the facts, the conduct of the Australian Securities 
Commission was “neither “unjust” nor “unconscionable” to use the expressions found in 
Thompson v Palmer and Verwayen.” The High Court referred to the following references in 
Verwayen’s case: (1990) 170 CLR, at 410–11, 429, 436, 440–41, 453–4, 500–1. 
72 (1999) 196 CLR 101. 
73 Ibid [7]. 
74 [2014] HCA 19. 
75 Whilst Sidhu concerned a proprietary estoppel claim, it may be noted that in dealing with the 
requirement for a plaintiff to prove detrimental reliance to establish a claim in equitable estoppel, 
the plurality (French CJ, Kiefel, Bell and Keane JJ) said at [58], “It is actual reliance by the 
promise, and the state of affairs so created, which answers the concern that equitable estoppel 
not be allowed to outflank Jorden v Money by dispensing with the need for consideration if a 
promise is to be enforceable as a contract.”  This statement is consistent with an acceptance of 
promissory estoppel as a source of rights as Jorden v Money and the issue of outflanking contract 
are irrelevant to positive relief in proprietary estoppel.   
76 [2003] NSWCA 318. 
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Wright v Hamilton Enterprises;77 ACN 074 971 109 Pty Ltd (as Trustee for the 
Argot Unit Trust) v The National Mutual Life Association of Australasia Ltd78; 
and Tipperary Developments Pty Ltd v Western Australia.79 In jurisdictions 
other than New South Wales, there is evidence of ongoing acceptance of 
Waltons Stores as authority for promissory estoppel as a source of positive 
rights: see for example, in the Federal Court of Australia, Yarrabee Chicken 
Company Pty Ltd v Steggles Limited;80 in Victoria, Leading Synthetics Pty Ltd v 
Adroit Insurance Group Pty Ltd & Anor;81  Eccles -v- Koolan Iron Ore Pty Ltd;82 
and in South Australia, Karthurmary Pty Ltd v Facac Pty Ltd.83  
In New South Wales too, the Court of Appeal had previously accepted that 
promissory estoppel was capable of being a source of rights.84  However, in 
Saleh v Romanous 85  the New South Wales Court of Appeal restated the 
principle as operating as a restraint on the exercise of rights only, not an 
independent source of rights. This section explores this change in the law in 
New South Wales, the possible reasons for it, and its consequences.  
A Saleh v Romanous 
Saleh v Romanous concerned a property development venture which did not go 
according to plan.  The defendants, Mr and Mrs Saleh, were the owners of a 
property in Sydney which they had purchased in early 2002 with a view to 
developing.  Mr Saleh’s brother, Edmund Saleh (‘Eddie’) who was not a party to 
the proceedings, owned the adjoining property.  The defendants had a plan to 
demolish the existing buildings on both properties and build eight, strata-titled 
two-storey townhouses in their place.  At the heart of the proceedings was the 
promise found to have been made by Mr Saleh to Mr Romanous, the 
prospective purchaser of the land, to the effect that: 
Michael said “Leave Eddie up to me. I’m taking responsibility for Eddie. If 
Eddie doesn’t want to build you don’t have to buy and you’ll get your money 
back”.86 
 
77 [2003] QCA 36. 
78 (2008) 21 VR 351, [171]. 
79 (2009) 258 ALR 124, although in that case the claimed failed for other reasons. 
80 [2010] FCA 394 per Jagot J.  Note this decision was not appealed on the estoppel finding but 
was successfully appealed in relation to findings in related proceedings concerned the findings 
on the construction of contract. 
81 [2011] VSC 467. 
82 [No 3] [2013] WASC 418 per Le Miere J at [91] (note: the estoppel claim did not succeed as 
reliance was not proven but the principle was described in terms relying upon Waltons Stores 
and accepting it as a source of rights). 
83 [2013] SASC 90 per Nicholson J at [85]-[95].   
84 Australian Crime Commission v Gray [2003] NSWCA 318. 
85 [2010] NSWCA 274; (2010) 79 NSWLR 453. 
86[2009] NSWSC 1166, [47]. 
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In May 2004, the defendants entered into a contract for the sale of the 
property to Mr and Mrs Romanous.  The purchase price was $670,000.  On 
exchange, Mr and Mrs Romanous paid the deposit of $67,000 but no agreement 
with Eddie for the development was reached and the contract was never 
completed.  
1 Romanous v Saleh - Judgment at First Instance 
The estoppel claim in the proceedings had at its heart the pre-contractual 
assurance alleged to have been given by Mr Saleh. 87  Forster J treated it as an 
application of promissory estoppel, citing the reasons of the majority in 
Waltons Stores for the elements of the doctrine of promissory estoppel.88   His 
Honour found that the circumstances of the case satisfied both the formulation 
of the doctrine by Brennan J and that of Mason CJ and Wilson J.89  His Honour 
held that the defendants were estopped from denying their obligation arising 
from Michael Saleh’s promise to repay the moneys advanced by Mr and Mrs 
Romanous and from enforcing the contract and suing them for its breach.90  It 
is important to consider the nature of the relief to which Forster J found Mr 
and Mrs Romanous were entitled.  The obligation upon the defendants to repay 
moneys advanced to them by Mr and Mrs Romanous was positive relief – 
requiring them to do something.   Estopping the defendants from enforcing the 
contract or suing for its breach was negative relief – restraining them from 
exercising contractual rights.  Forster J held both types of relief were available 
upon the proper application of the doctrine as stated in Waltons v Maher. In 
the result, the scope of the positive equitable relief granted to remedy the equity 
which arose from the promissory estoppel was limited to the refund of the 
deposit of $67,000.   
2 Appeal – Saleh v Romanous (2010) 79 NSWLR 453 
On appeal, Mr and Mrs Saleh challenged the findings of fact made below, 
particularly the finding that a promissory estoppel arose in the circumstances.  
There was no ground of appeal concerning the positive scope of relief awarded 
by the trial judge, or in relation to the application of Waltons Stores as authority 
 
87  Ibid [152]-[153]. There were also claims based on abandonment, frustration, innocent 
misrepresentation, misleading and deceptive conduct, repudiatory breach of the contract, relief 
against forfeiture in relation to the $200,000, relief under s 55(2A) of the Conveyancing Act 
1919 (NSW) in relation to the $67,000 deposit, claims based on unjust enrichment, a claim in 
debt for the recovery of the $200,000 loan and a quantum meruit claim in respect of plumbing 
services provided to the Salehs. 
88 Waltons Stores (Interstate) Ltd v Maher (1988) 164 CLR 387, 399, 404 per Mason CJ and 
Wilson J; 428-9 per Brennan J. 
89 [2009] NSWSC 1166, [167]-[177]. 
90 Ibid [178]-[179]. 
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for the principle that promissory estoppel could be used as a source of rights.  
However, in the Court of Appeal, Handley AJA (with whom Giles JA and 
Sackville AJA agreed) rejected the principle of law applied by Forster J that a 
promissory estoppel could give rise to positive relief.91 Handley AJA stated that, 
‘A promissory estoppel is a restraint on the enforcement of rights, and thus, 
unlike a proprietary estoppel, it must be negative in substance.’92   
Handley AJA referred to two statements of principle in English cases for 
the scope of promissory estoppel.  The first was Hughes v Metropolitan Railway 
Company,93 where Lord Cairns LC in his ‘classic statement of principle’ said: 
‘[T]he person who otherwise might have enforced those rights will not be 
allowed to enforce them where it would be inequitable having regard to the 
dealings which have thus taken place between the parties.’94  The second was 
Birmingham and District Land Company v London & North Western Railway 
Company.95 Handley AJA also referred to discussion to the same effect in his 
own text Estoppel by Conduct and Election.96 Waltons Stores was not discussed 
in relation to the scope of promissory estoppel.   Handley JA concluded: 
The Judge held that the promissory estoppel entitled the purchasers to 
rescind and recover their deposit.  In my judgment positive relief was not 
available on that ground but his decision that the promissory estoppel 
prevented the vendors enforcing the contract entitled the purchasers to an 
order under s55(2A).  The Judge’s orders .. can be affirmed without a formal 
order under the section.97 
Accordingly, the Court of Appeal used this statutory power to justify the 
order for the return of the deposit.  The appeal was dismissed.  The result in 
Saleh was ultimately the same purely by reason of the nature of the relief sought 
in the case and the fact that there existed a statutory power to order the return 
 
91 (2010) 79 NSWLR 453 per Handley JA, (Giles JA and Sackville AJA agreeing), 462 [73]. 
92 Ibid [74].  See  A Robertson, “Three models of promissory estoppel” (2013) Journal of Equity 
226 for a detailed discussion of both the nature of the principle of promissory estoppel advanced 
by Handley in his book Estoppel by Conduct and Election (Sweet & Maxwell, London, 2006) and 
applied by the Court of Appeal in Saleh, and the authorities which are inconsistent with this 
“restraint on rights model” of promissory estoppel.   
93 (1877) 2 App Cas 439. 
94 ibid 448. His Honour noted that this passage had been quoted by Lord Wilberforce in Bank 
Negara Indonesia v Hoalim [1973] 2 MLJ 3, a decision of the Privy Council.   
95(1888) 40 Ch D 268, 286 per Bowen LJ: ‘If persons who have contractual rights against others 
induce by their conduct those against whom they have such rights to believe that such rights will 
either not be enforced or will be kept in suspense or abeyance for some particular time, those 
persons will not be allowed by a Court of Equity to enforce the rights until such time has elapsed, 
without at all events placing the parties in the same position as they were before.’ 
96 (2010) 79 NSWLR 453, [74]-[76] referring to KR Handley, Estoppel by Conduct and Election, 
(Thomson Sweet & Maxwell, London 2006) at 201–203, 214–225. 
97(2010) 79 NSWLR 453 per Handley JA, (Giles JA and Sackville AJA agreeing), 462[81] 
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of the deposit.98   
3 Where was Waltons Stores? 
The ‘elephant in the room’ in the reasons for decision in the Court of Appeal in 
Saleh was the status of Waltons Stores as authority for the capacity of 
promissory estoppel to be an independent source of rights. It is striking that 
there is no direct reference to, or consideration of Waltons Stores; only 
reference to English authority.  It is all the more so given the fact that the trial 
judge had expressly referred to and relied upon passages in the judgments of 
the majority in Waltons Stores and applied them on the basis that they set out 
the relevant principle for promissory estoppel under Australian law.  The 
reasons given do not explain the basis on which it was open to the court to 
restate the principle of promissory estoppel in a contrary manner in light of the 
decision of the High Court in Waltons Stores.  There was no discussion as to 
why these passages were not statements of principle binding on Australian 
courts.  Nor did the Court of Appeal give any reasons addressing the error in 
earlier decisions of its own99 or of the other intermediate appellate courts100 
which had applied Waltons Stores as authority for promissory estoppel as a 
source of rights and why those cases ought not to be followed.    
The principles of the doctrine of precedent ordinarily prevent such a sharp 
change in direction in the law without detailed reasons.  Intermediate appellate 
courts are bound to apply the ratio of the High Court101 and are also required to 
follow ‘seriously considered’ obiter dicta of the High Court.102  They do not 
lightly overturn a decision of their own court unless persuaded it is ‘plainly 
wrong’ and then only in accordance with particular criteria.103  Likewise, 
decisions of other intermediate appellate courts are followed unless 
demonstrated to be clearly wrong.104 These principles ordinarily ensure that 
 
98 However, if the payments made by Mr and Mrs Romanous which were the subject of the 
promise had not fallen within the scope of s.55(2A), the Court of Appeal made it clear that there 
was no scope for positive relief.   
99 See for example Australian Crime Commission v Gray [2003] NSWCA 318. 
100See for example Wright v Hamilton Enterprises [2003] QCA 36; in Victoria ACN 074 971 109 
Pty Ltd (as Trustee for the Argot Unit Trust) v The National Mutual Life Association of 
Australasia Ltd (2008) 21 VR 351.  The only reference by the Court of Appeal of any of these 
cases was the statement at [69] that in Wright v Hamilton Enterprises [2003] QCA 36, ‘the relief 
granted should have been negative in substance, restraining the owner from determining the 
agreements unless the licensees were in breach.’  However this was in the context of discussing 
the relationship between promissory estoppel and the rule in Hoyt’s v Spencer, not the scope of 
promissory estoppel as discussed in Waltons Stores or other intermediate appellate court 
decisions.  
101 Garcia v National Australia Bank (1998) 194 CLR 395. 
102 Farah Constructions v Say-Dee (2007) 230 CLR 89 [134], [158]. 
103 See for example Gett v Tabet [2009] NSWCA 76; (2009) 254 ALR 504, at [294]-[295]. 
104 Ibid. 
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where a change to established principle is permissible, the process gives rise to 
very careful examination of the decided cases in the reasons for judgment.   
The reasons of the New South Wales Court of Appeal for restating the 
principle of promissory estoppel in its traditional scope without addressing the 
status of Waltons Stores on the scope of promissory estoppel under Australian 
law are not known. However, Handley AJA who delivered the reasons for 
judgment (in which Giles JA and Sackville AJA agreed) referred to his extra-
judicial writing on the topic of promissory estoppel105 and in this and other 
articles written extra-judicially, his views about the decision in Waltons Stores 
are developed.  He has observed:  
It seems therefore that four of the Judges upheld an expanded 
promissory estoppel, four a proprietary estoppel, and three an estoppel 
by representation based on silence, with the decision on proprietary 
estoppel based on orthodox principles.  The decision is an example of a 
hard case making bad law.  No judge at any level found for the 
company.  The reasoning in favour of an expanded promissory 
estoppel was contrary to principle and authority, and unnecessary. … 
The radical development in Waltons Stores was the enforcement of a 
promissory estoppel where there was no legal relationship between the 
parties.  Hitherto, promissory estoppel had been a negative and 
defensive equity which restrained enforcement of the promisor’s 
existing rights to protect the promise from detriment caused by his 
change of position.  It was not a freestanding right of the promise but a 
restrain on an existing right of the promisor.  Such an equity would not 
have helped the owners in Waltons Stores.106   
Handley concluded that, ‘[n]either promissory estoppel nor estoppel by 
encouragement form a principled basis for the creation of freestanding 
equitable rights in personam.’107 
There can be no doubt that the development of an expanded promissory 
estoppel was indeed a radical change to the previously accepted scope of the 
principle.  Views may differ as to the merits of developing promissory estoppel 
as capable of being an independent source of rights in relation to promises not 
concerning the grant of interests in land.108  However it is not the purpose of 
this article to debate the different views as to the merits of the development. 
 
105 Saleh v Romanous (2010) 79 NSWLR 453, [76], ‘The topic is considered in Handley ‘Estoppel 
by Conduct and Election’ 2006 at pp 201-3, 214-225.’ 
106 Hon Justice KR Handley, ‘The three High Court decisions on estoppel 1988-1990’ (2006) 80 
Australian Law Journal 724, 729. 
107 Ibid. 
108 For example, Ben McFarlane has suggested that another way of achieving the same end 
without requiring a change to promissory estoppel is to develop what he describes as ‘the 
promise-detriment principle,’ which he identifies as a strand of both promissory and proprietary 
estoppels, so that it can operate as a cause of action in circumstances not restricted to promises 
relating to land: See Ben McFarlane, above n 18, 268, 284.  
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The purpose of this analysis is rather to highlight the fact that regardless 
whether the expanded principle of promissory estoppel was the ratio of 
Waltons Stores, or ‘seriously considered dicta uttered by a majority’, departure 
from this principle by an intermediate court of appeal is difficult to justify.   
Equitable Relief and the Rule in Hoyt’s v Spencer 
The only other reason given by the Court of Appeal as to why promissory 
estoppel could not give positive relief related to a perceived conflict with the 
rule in Hoyt’s v Spencer.109  Handley AJA observed that the promissory estoppel 
which had been found was ‘not the equitable equivalent of a contract’ and so 
could give the purchasers positive rights to rescind and recover their deposit as 
would have been the case if it had contractual force.  His Honour held that, ‘[a] 
pre-contractual promissory estoppel which conferred positive rights of that 
nature would be contrary to Hoyt’s case.’110  This argument does not explain the 
wholesale rejection of promissory estoppel as capable of being an independent 
source of rights.  However, to the extent that the rule in Hoyt’s v Spencer is 
given as a reason for not permitting positive relief from the promissory estoppel 
in the circumstances of the case, it needs to be analysed.   
Hoyt’s v Spencer 111  is authority for the proposition that an informal 
collateral contract made in consideration for entering into the principal 
contract cannot be inconsistent with the terms of the principal contract. That 
common law principle with respect to the enforceability of collateral contracts 
is not in doubt. However, does it follow that where a promissory estoppel is 
made out, positive equitable relief that enforces a pre-contractual promise 
inconsistent with the contract contravenes the rule in Hoyt’s v Spencer?     In 
Waltons Stores, Mason CJ and Wilson J noted this concern.112  Brennan J, whilst 
not dealing directly with Hoyt’s case, specifically dealt with the fact that there 
are significant differences between positive equitable relief and contractual 
rights, noting that the equity required unconscionability and that in moulding 
the appropriate relief the court ‘goes no further than is necessary to prevent 
unconscionable conduct.’113 Brennan J’s analysis confirms that the enforcement 
of a promise as the most appropriate way to satisfy an equity arising from a 
promissory estoppel is not in origin contractual, nor is it enforced as a contract.  
Brennan J explained that:  
... [T]he object of the principle can be seen to be the avoidance of that 
detriment and the satisfaction of the equity calls for the enforcement of 
a promise only as a means of avoiding the detriment and only to the 
 
109 (1919) 27 CLR 133. 
110 Saleh v Romanous (2010) 79 NSWLR 453, [73]. 
111 (1919) 27 CLR 133  
112 (1988) 164 CLR 387, 400-401 per Mason CJ and Wilson J. 
113 (1988) 164 CLR 387, 419. 
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extent necessary to achieve that object. So regarded, equitable estoppel 
does not elevate non-contractual promises to the level of contractual 
promises and the doctrine of consideration is not blown away by a side 
wind.’114   
In other words, as relief is not contractual but equitable, the equitable 
enforcement of a promise – even a promise of a right to rescind – does not 
breach the common law rule dealing with inconsistent contractual provisions.  
Handley JA accepted that a promissory estoppel is not enforced as a 
contract, and that enforcement of a pre-contractual promissory estoppel is not 
barred by Hoyt’s case.115  However, this was only accepted in the context of 
promissory estoppel operating as an ‘equitable restraint on the exercise or 
enforcement of the promisor’s rights.’ 116   If promissory estoppel was an 
independent source of rights, this was apparently inconsistent with Hoyt’s 
case.117  However, Wright v Hamilton Enterprises118, a case referred to in 
Saleh,119 dealt with this very point.  In Wright, the appellants had each made 
oral agreements with the respondent that they would conduct respectively a 
restaurant and a bar at the Hamilton Island resort.  They later entered into 
written agreements described as ‘licences’.  The written licence agreements said 
nothing about renewal.  However, prior to entering into the written licence 
agreements, it was accepted that representatives of the respondent had 
promised each of them that provided they had the interests of the resort at 
heart, provided a good restaurant or bar, paid their accounts to the respondent 
on time, and complied with the requirements of their respective licence, the 
licences would be renewed at the licensee’s request and be ongoing.  The 
written licence agreements themselves however were expressed to be for a finite 
period of five years.  Pursuant to Article 14 of the licence, in the absence of any 
written agreement, a holding over period was provided for which could be 
cancelled on the giving of six months’ written notice by either party. 
At trial, Thomas J found for the licensees primarily on the basis of estoppel.  
However, his Honour also found that the promises made constituted a 
collateral contract.  On appeal, McMurdo P and Mackenzie J found that the 
promises said to constitute a collateral contract were inconsistent with Article 
14 and therefore could not be enforced as a collateral contract by reason of the 
rule in Hoyt’s v Spencer.  However, on appeal it was unanimously120 found that 
there was no error by the trial judge in his findings that a promissory estoppel 
had been made out.  Both McMurdo P and Jerrard JA specifically found that 
 
114 Ibid  426-427. 
115 Saleh v Romanous (2010) 79 NSWLR 453, [62]. 
116 Ibid. 
117 Ibid [73]. 
118 [2003] QCA 36. 
119 Saleh v Romanous (2010) 79 NSWLR 453, [69]. 
120 [2003] QCA 036, per McMurdo P, Jerrard and Mackenzie JJA. 
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the rule in Hoyt’s v Spencer did not preclude the finding of a promissory 
estoppel even if the content of the promise was inconsistent with the later 
contract. 121  Jerrard JA engaged in a detailed analysis of the reasons for 
judgment of Mason CJ and Wilson J, and of Brennan J, and found: 
These citations from Waltons v Maher make clear that all three of the 
judgments in that case which relied upon a promissory or equitable 
estoppel in dismissing the appeal in that case considered with care and 
dismissed the argument that reliance upon such an estoppel, to enforce 
what was described as a voluntary promise and particularly about 
future conduct, undermined the settled principles of consideration, 
and alternatively were inconsistent with Hoyt's v Spencer.122 
In Saleh, Handley AJA referred to Wright’s case123 but made no reference to 
these reasons addressing the effect of the rule in Hoyt’s v Spencer on promissory 
estoppel as a source of rights.  Wright’s case is inconsistent with the reasoning 
in Saleh that to enforce a promise by way of granting positive relief in equity is 
contrary to the rule in Hoyt’s v Spencer.   
4 Was the negative restatement of promissory estoppel the ratio of Saleh v 
Romanous? 
The question then arises whether this restatement of the scope of promissory 
estoppel as negative in substance and not capable of being a source of rights was 
part of the ratio of the decision of the Court of Appeal.  At trial, the scope of 
promissory estoppel to be an independent source of rights was not argued as an 
issue between them.  However, agreement by the parties as to a proposition of 
law does not bind a court.124 The court can raise or question a principle of law 
 
121 [2003] QCA 036, [12]-[13], McMurdo P found:, ‘I am not persuaded, however, that the 
doctrine of promissory estoppel, which involves the concept of unconscionability, cannot extend 
to promises which are inconsistent with a later contract entered into between the parties because 
of those promises. The subsequent contract may well cause evidentiary problems for the 
promisee but where the necessary requirements of promissory estoppel are established, 
including unconscionability if the promise is not met, then the subsequent inconsistent written 
contract will not preclude a finding of promissory estoppel: see SRA New South Wales v Heath 
Outdoor Pty Ltd.” 
122 Ibid, [51] 
123Saleh v Romanous (2010) 79 NSWLR 453, 461 [69]. 
124 Patorno v The Queen (1989) 166 CLR 466, 473 per Mason CJ and Brennan J applied in Soia v 
Bennett 2014] WASCA 27 [80] per Pullin JA. Mason CJ and Brennan J observed: ‘When the 
parties to an adversarial proceeding agree on a proposition of law and conduct their cases on 
that basis, their agreement does not bind the trial judge. If the judge determines the law to be 
different, he may apply the law as he determines it to be, but he must inform the parties of the 
view he has formed when that is necessary to give them an opportunity to address new issues 
arising from the judge's departure from the proposition of law on which the case was conducted. 
Otherwise both parties are taken by surprise: see Fairmount Ltd. v. Environment 
Secretary (citation omitted).’ 
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regardless of whether its scope is otherwise agreed between the parties.  It must 
follow that any such determination of a principle of law is capable of forming 
part of the ratio of a decision even if it was not ‘in issue’ as such between the 
parties, if it forms part of the principle of law used to determine the 
proceedings.   
In Saleh v Romanous, the Court of Appeal expressly raised and determined 
that the principle of promissory estoppel was different in scope to that 
explained and applied by the trial judge.  Furthermore, the scope of the 
principle was a matter upon which a decision was necessary for the Court of 
Appeal to reject the positive equitable relief ordered by the trial judge and 
instead, to refund the deposit under its power pursuant to s. 55(2A).  Therefore 
the restatement of principle was a ‘necessary step’ in the decision of the Court 
of Appeal and the orders that were made, and thus constituted a ratio of the 
decision.125  
5 Refusal of leave to appeal 
In 2011 the High Court refused leave to appeal126 from Saleh v Romanous.127 
However, the issue identified on the special leave application did not relate to 
the ability of promissory estoppel to be a source of rights.128  The refusal of 
special leave has been noted by the NSW Court of Appeal in the context of 
confirming the negative scope of the principle in New South Wales. 129  
However it cannot be taken as an indirect endorsement of the contrary 
principle expressed by the Court of Appeal.  Mason CJ, writing extra-judicially, 
once observed that: 
There has been a tendency on the part of the profession and some 
judges to treat the refusal by the High Court of special leave to appeal 
as an endorsement of the decision below.  However, the High Court, 
like the House of Lords, has declared that refusal of special leave is not 
 
125 Cf Robertson, above n 92, 231. 
126 [2011] HCTrans 101. 
127 Saleh v Romanous (2010 79 NSWLR 453. 
128 [2011] HCTrans 101.  It related to the issue argued before the Court of Appeal as to whether 
promissory estoppel ought to be permitted to trump the parol evidence rule.  The issue was put 
in oral submissions by counsel in the following way: “We submit that if you look at the 
foundation of the parol evidence rule and the consequence which it has for the certainty of 
commercial contracts, in particular, it would be appropriate for this Court to, in effect, set a 
limit to the doctrine of promissory estoppel so that it does not conflict with it.  That is essentially 
the issue which we propound in this case.” 
129 DHJPM Pty Limited v Blackthorn Resources Limited (formerly called AIM Resources Limited) 
(2011) 83 NSWLR 728 at [93] per Handley AJA, ‘The appellant relied on an equitable, that is a 
proprietary estoppel, particularly an estoppel by encouragement.  Its arguments strayed at times 
into promissory estoppel but, as this Court unanimously held in Saleh v Romanous [2010] 
NSWCA 274 (special leave refused [2011] HCATrans 101), a promissory estoppel must be 
negative in substance.  It is an equitable restraint on the enforcement of the promisor’s rights.’ 
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an affirmation of the decision or of the reasons for decision below.  
This is because the fate of the application may depend on any one or 
more of a number of reasons.  The question sought to be argued may 
not be of public or general importance; it may raise no question of 
general principle; it may not be a suitable vehicle for the determination 
of such a question; the case may depend on its own facts.130 
The High Court recently confirmed that reasons for refusal of special leave 
create no binding principle.131  Accordingly, nothing can be taken from the 
refusal of leave in relation to the view the High Court might take of the decision. 
B Does Saleh bind lower courts in New South Wales? The  principle in 
Milangos v George Frank (Textiles) Ltd 
If it is correct to conclude that the restatement of the principle of promissory 
estoppel was a ratio of the Court of Appeal, then the question is whether this 
judgment binds the courts below the Court of Appeal in the New South Wales 
hierarchy of courts, regardless of the view that may be taken by a primary judge 
as to whether Saleh conflicts with the ratio of the High Court in Waltons Stores.  
In the House of Lords in Miliangos v George Frank (Textiles) Ltd, Lord Simon 
of Glaisdale observed:  
It is the duty of a subordinate court to give credence and effect to the 
decision of the immediately higher court, notwithstanding that it may 
appear to conflict with the decision of a still higher court. The decision 
of the still higher court must be assumed to have been correctly 
distinguished (or otherwise interpreted) in the decision of the 
immediately higher court ... Any other course is not only a path to legal 
chaos but in effect involves a subordinate court sitting in judgment on 
a decision of its superior court. That is contrary to law.132 
If this is also the law in Australia, this principle requires a primary judge to 
follow a decision of an intermediate court of appeal, notwithstanding the 
existence of an earlier contrary decision in the High Court.  Therefore, lower 
courts in New South Wales are required to apply the ratio in Saleh v Romanous, 
notwithstanding the conflict with the ratio of Waltons Stores. 
The principle in Miliangos v George Frank (Textiles) Ltd has been applied 
in Australia to this effect at first instance in Pettigrew v Federal Commissioner of 
 
130 The Hon Sir Anthony Mason KBE, “The Use and Abuse of Precedent” (1988) 4 Australian 
Bar Review 93, 96-97, citing at footnote 8 the Editorial Notes to Blackmore v Linton [1961] VR 
374, 380; Mihaljevic v Longyear (Australia) Pty Ltd (1985) 3 NSWLR 1 at 25; Sir Anthony Mason, 
“Where Now?” (1975) 49 Australian Law Journal 570, 575; and Wilson v Colchester Justices 
[1985] 2 All ER 97, 100. 
131 Mount Bruce Mining Pty Limited v Wright Prospecting Pty Limited; [2015] HCA 37, see in 
particular [112], [119]. 
132 [1976] AC 443, 478. 
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Taxation, 133  New Cap Reinsurance Corporation Ltd v AE Grant 134  and 
Huntingdale Village Pty Ltd v Corrs Chambers Westgarth.135  In New Cap 
Reinsurance, White J concluded that the decision of the New South Wales 
Court of Appeal in Box Valley Pty Ltd v Kidd136 in relation to the scope of s 95A 
of the Corporations Act was inconsistent with the ratio of the High Court on 
the same issue in Bank of Australasia v Hall.137  It was submitted by the 
liquidator that the earlier ratio of the High Court should be followed in 
preference to the Court of Appeal.138  However, his Honour held that on the 
principle in Miliangos v George Frank (Textiles) Ltd, he was bound to apply the 
contrary decision of the Court of Appeal.139  In Huntingdale, Le Miere J applied 
the same principle and said: 
Where a single judge of this court is faced with a decision of the Court 
of Appeal and a later conflicting decision of the High Court, as a 
general rule the High Court decision will be followed. However, where 
one of the parties argues that the ratio of a decision of the Court of 
Appeal is in conflict with the ratio of an earlier decision of the High 
Court, the duty of a single judge of this court is to follow the decision 
of the Court of Appeal.140 
In essence, the Miliangos principle simply reinforces the requirements of stare 
decisis in the face of what might seem to be a competing duty.  It confirms the 
duty of a lower court to apply the ratio of a decision of a court immediately 
superior in the hierarchy even where there is an earlier, conflicting ratio of the 
ultimate appellate court in that hierarchy of courts.  However its application to 
a federation of states, such as Australia, gives rise to a potential problem for the 
unity of the ‘one common law’ of Australia that does not arise in the same way 
within the English judicial hierarchy. The potential exists for a change in the 
common law by one intermediate appellate court to become binding within 
that jurisdiction despite contrary High Court authority, whilst other 
jurisdictions continue to follow the relevant High Court authority and any 
conforming authority of their own intermediate appellate courts.  The High 
Court has said that where there is a difference between intermediate appellate 
courts, it does not mean that the unity of the common law does not exist, it 
simply means that one or more intermediate courts of appeal will have not 
 
133 (1989) ATC 4475, 4484-5 per Murphy J. 
134 (2008) 68 ACSR 176 per White J. 
135 [2011] WASC 44, [23] – [24] per Le Miere J. 
136 (2006) 24 ACLC 471.  
137 (1907) 4 CLR 1514.  The issue concerned whether if the company’s insurance liabilities were 
to pay unliquidated damages for breach of contract, the court was bound to ignore them for the 
purposes of determining the company’s ‘debts’ under s 95A. 
138 (2008) 68 ACSR 176, [71] per White J. 
139 At [71]. 
140 Ibid [24]. 
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applied the law correctly.141 However, the Miliangos principle has a very real 
impact upon the practical unity of the common law in Australia, in the sense 
that the same set of facts might then be required to be decided according to 
entirely contrary principles in different jurisdictions. This problem does not 
arise in its application under English law. 
The High Court has not had the opportunity to consider the application of 
the Miliangos principle in Australia. There are statements of principle with 
respect to the doctrine of precedent which on one view, appear to reject any 
limitation upon the requirement of all courts, intermediate courts of appeal and 
trial courts, to apply the ratio and seriously considered dicta of the High Court.  
For example, in hearing an application for leave to appeal in Western Export 
Services Inc v Jireh International Pty Ltd,142 the High Court referred to the 
obligation of primary judges to apply the precedent of the High Court even in 
the face of contrary views of intermediate courts of appeal.  In that case, 
Gummow, Heydon and Bell JJ observed: 
Acceptance of the applicant’s submission, clearly would require 
reconsideration by this court of what was said in Codelfa Construction 
Pty Ltd v State Rail Authority (NSW)8 by Mason J, with the 
concurrence of Stephen and Wilson JJ, to be the “true rule” as to the 
admission of evidence of surrounding circumstances. Until this court 
embarks upon that exercise and disapproves or revises what was said in 
Codelfa, intermediate appellate courts are bound to follow that 
precedent. The same is true of primary judges, notwithstanding what 
may appear to have been said by intermediate appellate courts. 143 
(emphasis added) 
This could be interpreted as inconsistent with the principle expressed in 
Miliangos,144 but as it was a leave disposition and not a judgment delivered 
following a hearing, it creates no binding precedent.   
In Lipohar v R, Gaudron Gummow and Hayne JJ observed that:  
The ultimate foundation of precedent which binds any court to 
statements of principle is, as Barwick CJ put it, "that a court or tribunal 
higher in the hierarchy of the same juristic system, and thus able to 
reverse the lower court's judgment, has laid down that principle as part 
of the relevant law". Until the High Court rules on the matter, the 
doctrines of precedent which bind the respective courts at various 
levels below it in the hierarchy will provide a rule for decision.145 
(emphasis added) 
 
141 Lipohar v R (1999) 200 CLR 485 [45] per Gaudron, Gummow and Hayne JJ. 
142 [2011] 282 ALR 604. 
143 Ibid [3]. 
144 This was noted in Lew Footwear Holdings Pty Ltd v Madden International Ltd [2014] VSC 320 
per Elliot J at [117]. 
145 (1999) 200 CLR 485, [45]. 
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It is perhaps arguable that this statement of principle is broad enough to cover 
the situation in which the High Court has already ruled on a matter before an 
intermediate court of appeal rules on the same matter in different terms.  
However, these general statements cannot be read as dispositive of the 
Miliangos question in the absence of it being considered directly.   
It is argued that it is likely that the High Court would endorse the principle 
to avoid the same vice identified by Lord Simon of Glaisdale in Miliangos: to 
permit otherwise would put a judge at first instance in the invidious position of 
sitting in judgment on the correctness of a decision of his or her immediately 
superior court and would fundamentally alter the doctrine of stare decisis.  If a 
primary’s judge’s decision refusing to apply the ratio of the Court of Appeal in 
that jurisdiction were appealed to that Court of Appeal, the appeal would be 
almost certainly doomed to fail.   Ultimately, the appeal process permits leave 
to be sought to bring an appropriate case from an intermediate appellate court 
to the High Court to clarify the law and particularly to resolve differences 
between intermediate courts of appeal in relation to the common law.  For 
present purposes, it is clear that lower courts in New South Wales regard 
themselves as bound by the decision of the Court of Appeal in Saleh v 
Romanous.146      
C Subsequent consideration of Saleh by the New South Wales Court of Appeal 
The New South Wales Court of Appeal is of course not bound by its earlier 
decision in Saleh.147  However, to date, it has not departed from the principle 
applied in Saleh and has affirmed it in DHJPM Pty Ltd v Blackthorn Resources 
Ltd148, Hammond v JP Morgan Trust Australia Ltd,149 Van Dyke v Sidhu150 and 
Ashton v Pratt.  The reasons in these decisions do not contain any discussion of 
the ratio in Waltons Stores. Hammond v JP Morgan Trust Australia Ltd151 and 
Van Dyke v Sidhu152 did not concern promissory estoppel issues, the former 
being an orthodox promissory estoppel case seeking to restrain the exercise of 
existing rights and the latter an orthodox proprietary estoppel case.  
Accordingly, the analysis in this part focusses on the two decisions in DHJPM 
Pty Ltd v Blackthorn Resources Ltd and Ashton v Pratt in which the scope of 
 
146 See for example, GE Healthcare Australia Pty Ltd v Medica Radiology and Nuclear Medicine 
Pty Ltd [2013] NSWSC 414, [8]; and Van Dyke v Sidhu [2012] NSWSC 118 per Ward J. 
147 See for example Nguyen v Nguyen (1990) 169 CLR 245, 268-9 per Dawons, Toohey and 
McHugh JJ. 
148 (2011) 285 ALR 311. 
149 (2012) 16 BPR 30,901 at [26] per Meagher JA with whom Basten JA and Bergin CJ in Eq 
agreed). 
150 (2013) 301 ALR 769, at [39] per Barrett JA, with whom Basten JA and Tobias AJA agreed). 
151 (2012) 16 BPR 30,901 at [26] per Meagher JA with whom Basten JA and Bergin CJ in Eq 
agreed). 
152 (2013) 301 ALR 769, at [39] per Barrett JA, with whom Basten JA and Tobias AJA agreed). 
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promissory estoppel to be an independent source of rights arose directly. 
1 DHJPM Pty Ltd v Blackthorn Resources Ltd – recharactising Waltons Stores 
as a proprietary estoppel case 
DHJPM Pty Ltd v Blackthorn Resources Ltd153 concerned facts which were not 
dissimilar to Waltons Stores in the sense that it was a claim by an intending 
lessor to enforce, as against an intended lessee, its expectation that a lease 
would be entered into. On appeal from the District Court, Meagher JA (with 
whom Basten JA agreed) held that the primary judge had correctly found that 
no estoppel arose because in the circumstances of the lack of agreement as to 
essential terms, it was not unreasonable for the prospective lessee to refuse to 
enter into an agreement on the proposed terms. However, his Honour’s 
discussion of the basis for the estoppel claim conformed to the scope of the 
doctrine expressed in Saleh.  Meagher JA referred to the identification in 
Waltons Stores of the traditional distinction between promissory and 
proprietary estoppels,154 but not to the reasons given by the Mason CJ and 
Wilson J, or by Brennan J, for rejecting the traditional limitation upon the 
scope of promissory estoppel.   Rather, his Honour said that, ‘In this context I 
note that this court said in [Saleh] that a promissory estoppel operates as an 
equitable restraint on the exercise or enforcement of contractual and other 
rights and is negative in substance.’155   
Interestingly, Meagher JA referred to Waltons Stores as an application of 
equitable estoppel to enforce proprietary rights. 156  However, ultimately, in his 
Honour’s view, the outcome of the appeal in DHJPM did not turn on whether 
the equitable estoppel relied upon was “a proprietary estoppel or a promissory 
estoppel with respect to a promise to create new rights.”157  Meagher JA 
reasoned that Brennan J’s propositions applied to an ‘orthodox proprietary 
estoppel’ and if the claim in that case had been supported by the evidence, it 
could have been supported as ‘an orthodox proprietary estoppel by which [the 
respondent] encouraged an expectation that an interest by way of reversion on 
a sublease would come into existence.’158   
Handley JA noted that the appellant in DHJPM  had relied upon an 
“equitable, that is proprietary estoppel, particularly an estoppel by 
encouragement.”159  His Honour observed that: 
 
153 (2011) 285 ALR 311. 
154 Ibid 322 [43]. 
155 Ibid [47]. 
156 Ibid 321 [40]. 
157 Ibid [48]. 
158 Ibid. 
159 Ibid 333 [93]. 
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its arguments strayed at times into promissory estoppel but, as this 
court unanimously held in Saleh v Romanous … (special leave refused 
[2011] HCATrans 101), a promissory estoppel must be negative in 
substance.160   
His Honour also discussed in detail the principles of, and cases on, proprietary 
estoppel by encouragement.161  His Honour noted that such estoppels have ‘a 
long pedigree’ and in this context also, also appeared to treat Waltons Stores as 
a case of estoppel by encouragement.  His Honour described Waltons Stores as 
one of only two cases to his knowledge where, ‘an estoppel by encouragement 
has been held to create an executory contract.’162  
This re-characterisation of Waltons Stores as a proprietary estoppel case 
raises an important issue.  Robertson has argued, rightly it is submitted, that 
‘this rationalisation of Waltons Stores as a proprietary estoppel case is clearly 
inconsistent with the judgments.’163  No judge in Waltons Stores gave any 
express reasons for finding that the case could be disposed of by application of 
an orthodox proprietary estoppel.  Even if one accepts that it might be possible 
to reconceptualise the issues in Waltons Stores as falling within an 
unconventional application of an estoppel by encouragement, treating the 
express reasons of the majority in favour of expanding promissory estoppel as 
obiter dicta, or ignoring those reasons altogether, fundamentally undermines 
the authority of the decision.   
In Deakin v Webb164 decided in 1904, Griffiths CJ emphasized the regard to 
be had to the actual reasons for judgment of the High Court, even where an 
alternate basis for the disposition of the issues might be said to exist.  His 
Honour said: 
A court of law performs the double function of declaring the law, and 
of applying it to the facts. When the legal principles which govern the 
case are in controversy, it is the practice of English Courts not to 
content themselves with a statement of their conclusion, but to express 
their reasons, which, in the case of Courts of Appeal, are ordinarily 
accepted by other courts upon whom the decision is binding, as an 
authoritative exposition of the law on the point under consideration.  
If the reasons may be disregarded and treated as mere obiter dicta, 
because, in the opinion of the court, the same conclusion might have 
been reached by another road, the value of judgments as expositions of 
the law would be sensibly diminished.165 
Accordingly, it is respectfully suggested that even if Waltons Stores can be 
 
160 Ibid. 
161 ibid 334-335 [100]-[124]. 
162 (2011) 285 ALR 311, 335 [106]. 
163 Robertson, above n 92, 232. 
164 (1904) 1 CLR 585. 
165 (1904) 1 CLR 585, 604-5. 
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reconceptualised as an estoppel by encouragement case and ‘the same 
conclusion reached by another road’, the recognition of an expanded 
promissory estoppel was a ratio of the case which cannot be ignored.   
2 Ashton v Pratt166 
In these proceedings, one of Ms Ashton’s claims was that was that from late 
2003 she did not return to the escort industry and remained Mr Pratt’s mistress 
on the assumption that he would pay her various sums and settle money on 
trust for her children.167 Bathurst CJ noted that the claim was put on the basis 
of equitable estoppel, and was not a claim in proprietary estoppel.168  In 
addressing the law, his Honour set out Brennan J’s reasons on the elements of 
equitable estoppel169, and also referred to the reasons of Mason CJ and Wilson 
J170, and Deane J171. However, he expressed no view as to the ratio of Waltons 
Stores.  His Honour instead noted that propositions 3, 4 and 5 of Priestley JA’s 
summary of the propositions that could be derived from Waltons Stores (in 
Silovi v Barbaro172, reformulated in Austotel v Franklins173) ‘seem to extend the 
boundaries of promissory estoppel beyond what was suggested by Handley AJA 
in Saleh.’174 His Honour also referred175 to Saleh and DHJPM,176 and to the 
decision of the House of Lords in Thorner v Major177 in which Lord Walker 
confirmed the distinction under English law between promissory and 
proprietary estoppels. Bathurst CJ concluded that: 
This analysis of the authorities demonstrates two significant obstacles 
to Ms Ashton’s claim based on equitable estoppel.  First, there is a 
significant body of authority in this Court, as well as at least one 
decision of the House of Lords, which has maintained the distinction 
between the scope of promissory and proprietary estoppel.  These cases 
indicate that the former only acts as a restrain on the enforcement of 
legal rights whilst the latter can be a source of obligation.  However, it 
 
166Ashton v Pratt [2015] NSWCA 12. 
167 The claim was that Mr Pratt would settle $2.5 million on trust for each of her children, pay 
her an allowance of $500,000 per annum, pay her $36,000 for rental accommodation and 
$30,000 per annum for business expenses.   
168 [2015] NSWCA 12, [108]. 
169 Waltons Stores, per Brennan J at 428-429. 
170 Ibid, at 406. 
171 Ibid at 450-452. 
172 (1988) 13 NSWLR 466, 472. 
173 (1989) 16 NSWLR 582. 
174 Ashton v Pratt [2015] NSWCA 1, [128]. 
175 Ibid [133]-[136]. 
176 Saleh v Romanous [2010] NSWCA 274; (2010) 79 NSWLR 453, and DHJPM Pty Ltd v 
Blackthorn Resources Ltd [2011] NSWCA 348; (2011) 83 NSWLR 728. 
177 [2009] 1 WLR 776. 
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must be acknowledged that there is significant dicta contrary to this 
limitation on promissory estoppel.178 
Bathurst CJ found it unnecessary to resolve the issues as Ms Ashton had failed 
to establish that she had suffered detriment as a result of Mr Pratt resiling from 
the promises.  Similarly Meagher JA did not find it necessary to decide the 
estoppel question, but also noted that: 
One question is whether the doctrine of equitable estoppel extend to 
assumptions or expectations created in relation to the fulfilment of 
promises which are not negative in substance and do not suspend or 
extinguish existing contractual or other rights as Brennan J considered 
to be the position in Waltons Stores …179 
Meagher JA made no reference to the reasons of Mason CJ and Wilson J, or the 
ratio of Waltons Stores.  Neither Bathurst CJ or Meagher JA discussed whether 
this ‘seriously considered dicta’ by the High Court in Waltons Stores ought to 
be binding or not, or the reasons for not following it. 
IV WOULD THE HIGH COURT OVERTURN WALTONS STORES? 
The High Court has made it clear there is one ‘common law’ of Australia, not a 
different common law in each jurisdiction. 180 In Kable v The Director of Public 
Prosecutions for New South Wales, McHugh J observed, “Unlike the United 
States of America where there is a common law of each State, Australia has a 
unified common law which applies in each State but is not itself the creature of 
any State”.181  His Honour confirmed the High Court’s role in ‘maintaining a 
unified system of common law.’182 This underpinned the High Court’s direction 
in Farah Constructions Pty Ltd v Say-Dee Pty Ltd that courts of appeal should 
not depart from decisions in intermediate appellate courts in other jurisdictions 
on a principle of common law unless convinced that the decision is plainly 
wrong. 183  In Lipohar v R, the High Court noted that where different 
intermediate courts of appeal give inconsistent rulings upon questions of 
 
178 Ashton v Pratt [2015] NSWCA 12, [138]. 
179 Ibid, [236] per Meagher JA. 
180 In PGA v The Queen (2012) 245 CLR 355, French CJ, Gummow, Hayne, Crennan and Kiefel 
JJ discussed the different meanings of ‘common law’ citing at [20] with apparent approval from 
the contribution by Professor A W B Simpson under the heading “common law” in The New 
Oxford Companion to Law, in which he distinguished five senses in which that term is used. The 
primary sense is that body of non-statutory law which was common throughout the realm and 
so applicable to all, rather than local or personal in its application. Their Honours further noted 
at [25] that the common law which was received in the Australian colonies was not disintegrated 
into six separate bodies of law.   
181 Kable v DPP (NSW) (1996) 189 CLR 51 at 112 -113 per McHugh J. 
182 Ibid. 
183 Farah Constructions Pty Ltd v Say-Dee Pty Ltd (2007) 230 CLR 89 at [135]; see also PGA v The 
Queen (2012) 245 CLR 355 at [111] per Heydon J.   
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common law, this demonstrates not that there is more than one common law, 
but that one or other of the courts will not have correctly applied or declared 
the common law. The Court emphasised its role in determining such 
disputes. 184  The current disagreement between the intermediate courts of 
appeal with respect to the ability of promissory estoppel to be a source of rights 
is such a problem which is likely to attract leave to appeal.185 
If it is correct that the ratio of Waltons Stores was that promissory estoppel 
can be used as a source of rights, then the question is no longer an open one for 
the High Court to consider, as it is in other jurisdictions such as England.186  If 
an appropriate vehicle arises to bring this current lack of unity between the 
states as to the scope of promissory estoppel before the High Court, the real 
question will be whether there are considerations which warrant overturning 
Waltons Stores.   
The considerations that the High Court takes into account in deciding 
whether to overturn a previous decision do not immediately suggest that it 
should be overturned.  There is of course no dispute as to the High Court’s 
capacity to depart from its earlier decisions.  Although there is ‘no very definite 
rule’ as to the circumstances in which the High Court will do so, there are a 
number of recognised considerations which will be relevant.  These 
considerations include whether the earlier decision ‘did not rest upon a 
principle carefully worked out in a significant succession of cases’; differences 
in the reasons of the justices constituting the majority; whether the earlier 
decisions had ‘achieved no useful result but on the contrary had led to 
considerable inconvenience’ and whether the earlier decisions had been 
independently acted on in a manner which militated against reconsideration: 
John v FCT. 187  Guided by these principles, it is unlikely that a differently 
composed court would lightly depart from Waltons Stores on the scope of 
promissory estoppel.  The development in the law propounded by the majority 
in Waltons Stores was the result of detailed and deliberate reasoning, taking 
into account the relevant cases at the time and the rationale for the equity 
which underpinned them, and it has been considered and (largely) ‘worked out’ 
in a succession of cases since.  There was no significant difference in the 
reasoning of the judges in the majority (other than in relation to the 
requirement for an assumption as to a legal relationship), and a review of the 
history of its application in the last 25 years does not demonstrate that its 
 
184 Lipohar v R (1999) 200 CLR 485, [45] per Gaudron, Gummow and Hayne JJ. 
185 See for example New South Wales v Lepore (2003) 212 CLR 511 [6] per Gleeson CJ, in relation 
to leave granted in the appeal.  That case concerned three proceedings heard concurrently 
arising from an appeal brought from the New South Wales Court of Appeal which had not been 
followed by the Queensland Court of Appeal, giving rise to ‘a conflict of authority between 
intermediate courts of appeal in this country that requires resolution.’ 
186 See Ben McFarlane, above n 18. 
187 (1989) 166 CLR 417, 438-439. 
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application has led to ‘considerable inconvenience’ of the type that has been 
understood as warranting the overturning of a previous decision.  
In Wurridjal v Commonwealth French CJ confirmed that the High Court 
in such situations should be ‘informed by a strongly conservative cautionary 
principle, adopted in the interests of continuity and consistency in the law.”188  
On this note, in Baker v Campbell, Brennan J observed: 
To regard the judgments of this Court as open to reconsideration 
whenever a new argument is found more attractive than the principle 
expressed in a standing decision is to overlook the function which a 
final court of appeal must perform in defining the law.  In difficult 
areas of the law, differences of legal opinion are inevitable ….It is not 
to the point to argue in the next case that, leaving the particular 
decision out of account, another solution is better supported by legal 
theory.  Such an approach would diminish the authority and finality of 
the judgments of this Court.  As the function of defining the law is 
vested in the Court rather than in the justices who compose it, a 
decision of the Court will be followed in subsequent cases by the Court, 
however composed, subject to the exception power which resides in 
the Court of permit reconsideration.189 
Referring to these principles with approval, Hayne J in Lee v New South 
Wales190 cited Horrigan observing that, ‘the previous decision is to be treated as 
the primary premise from which other arguments follow, not just as one 
potential premise among an aggregate of competing premises.’  
V CONCLUSION 
Notwithstanding recent judicial expressions of uncertainty as to the scope of 
promissory estoppel to be a source of rights under Australian law, it was the 
ratio of Waltons Stores that promissory estoppel is capable of being a source of 
rights under Australian law.  As such, the ‘one common law’ of Australia on 
this question is not unclear.  Even if the reasons of the majority in that case are 
no higher than strongly considered dicta, the reasoning ought to be followed.  
Accordingly, the law is not in an ‘unresolved’ state in which it is open to trial 
judges, or intermediate courts of appeal, to apply a contrary principle.   
However, the difficulty for Australian law is that there is no practical unity 
of the common law since the contrary decision of the Court of Appeal in New 
South Wales in Saleh v Romanous, which now binds lower courts in New South 
Wales.  The result is that the same claim can be decided according to entirely 
contrary principles, depending on whether proceedings are commenced in New 
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South Wales or another state.  Accordingly, unless the Court of Appeal 
reconsiders its position, it is to be hoped that a suitable vehicle for the 
resolution by the High Court of these jurisdictional differences arrives soon. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
